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The paper by Charles Wyplozs provides a fairly comprehensive, clearly written and overall 
balanced overview of the role of fiscal rules and institutions in helping ensuring fiscal 
discipline. I agree with its main conclusions, which I read as follows: fiscal policy is affected 
by a serious deficit bias, the dangers of which have been exposed by the financial crisis; fiscal 
rules and institutions, while no panacea, are complementary instruments towards correcting 
deficit bias; in binding policies and their makers, rules and institutions are themselves subject 
to time-consistency problems, which can be mitigated by careful design exploiting their 
complementarity. My discussion is organised as follows after (i) touching on the technical 
issue of the empirical definition of fiscal discipline, I briefly review (ii) the broad concept of 
fiscal governance, which includes but is not limited to the dichotomy rules vs. institutions and 
in this connection I briefly elaborate on the complementarity between the different elements 
of fiscal governance; I then point to (iii) recent findings that lend support to the effectiveness 
of fiscal rules; some considerations on (iv) the state of the play in the euro area conclude. 
 
(i) At the outset the paper defines fiscal discipline in terms of the "[debt] ratio [being] 
stationary over a sustained period" and presents for a number of industrial countries the result 
of two methodologies testing the null hypothesis of, respectively, non-stationarity and 
stationarity. My basic point is that such tests are a way of helping one read the corresponding 
tie series but not too much should be read into them. This is illustrated by the profile of the 
corresponding the debt ratios over the period considered (Figure 1). 
 




* gross general government debt; ** net central government debt 
 
With most profiles exhibiting a hump-shaped pattern, with the debt ratio typically peaking in 
the late 80s and early 90s (before resuming an upward trend since the start of the explosion of 
                                                 
1 (1) I would like to thank Matteo Salto and Ombeline Gras for useful exchanges. The views express remain 
mine and do not necessarily correspond to those of the European Commission. the financial crisis in 2008), it is not surprising that the tests tend to reject stationary but rarely 
if ever reject non-stationarity either. Moreover, if a trend is non-stationary, its mirror image 
must be equally non-stationary: this is the reason why Norway, where the debt has been in 
overall decline since the early 80s is classified as 'non-stationary', while few would probably 
argue that the country has a fiscal discipline problem.  
 
Stationarity tests moreover do not take into account the level around which stationarity is 
tested, while clearly this matters for overall perception of sustainability of a country's fiscal 
policies, a point underscored by the recent strand of empirical literature finding significant 
threshold effects in the relationship between government debt and growth (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2010; Kuhmar and Woo 2012). 
 
(ii) The paper focuses on the dichotomy rules vs. institutions. I broadly agree with the 
definitions that are given of fiscal rules and fiscal councils (a particular type of institution) but 
I think that the discussion would gain from integrating other elements. For example, the paper 
highlights the role of a "better budgetary process" in improving budgetary discipline but does 
note elaborate on the dimensions conducive to a better quality of the budgetary process. 
Likewise, it mentions the time dimension of fiscal rules but does not discuss the role of 
medium-term budgetary frameworks, namely, the fiscal arrangements whereby the horizon of 
fiscal planning is extended beyond the annual calendar. Taking into account these different 
elements it may be preferable to elaborate the different institutional dimensions of fiscal 
policy under the encompassing concept of fiscal governance rather than in terms of rules vs. 
institutions. This would include four main dimensions: numerical fiscal rules, independent 
fiscal medium-term budgetary frameworks and budgetary procedures (European Commission 
2010). In the same vein, while I fully agree that fiscal rules and institutions should be seen as 
complements rather than substitutes to each other, I would carry the argument further so as to 
encompass the four dimensions and their interconnections: for example, a budget balance rule 
is best seen a providing a medium-term objective, which needs to be operationalised through 
binding expenditure ceilings based on a multi-annual expenditure rule; in turn, expenditure 
ceilings to be effective need to be supported by top-down budgeting and the expenditure rule 
needs to be inscribed in a medium-term framework constraining the annual budgetary process. 
 
(iii) The paper stresses that in fiscal rules are often disappointing and acknowledges that the 
econometric evidence on their impact ton budgetary discipline is not overwhelming. While I 
certainly agree with the first proposition and could not contest the second, I would like to 
point to a couple of recent empirical studies that strengthen the case for an independent effect 
of fiscal rules on budgetary discipline. Using a unique data set for the EU summarizing the 
quality of numerical fiscal rules and medium-term budgetary frameworks Iara and Wolff 
(2010) estimate the impact of enhancing the quality of the budgetary framework in a 
structural model of sovereign spreads in the presence of different level of risk aversion: after 
controlling for the effects of debt and deficit and fixed countries effects, the time-varying 
fiscal governance quality is found to have a significant effect on risk premia, which is greater 
depending on the overall level of risk aversion and deficit and debt level (owing to the log-
linear specification of the model). The main argument against the evidence on the effect of 
fiscal rule revolves around reverse causality, i.e., high-quality fiscal framework may be 
simply a characteristic of polities that care about fiscal discipline and not have an independent 
effect on it. An interesting testing field in this respect is provided by the experience of Swiss 
cantons, which is studied by Feld and others (2011): while sharing common institutional and 
cultural characteristics , Swiss cantons differ remarkable in terms of presence and strength of 
fiscal  rules and these are shown to contribute significantly to cantonal spreads; moreover, the 'natural experiment' of a 2003 court decision relieving cantons from responsibilities towards 
lower municipal entities in financial distress – equivalent to the establishment of a credible 
no-bail-out rule – is shown to have been effective in severing the link between cantonal risk 
premia and municipal financial situations. 
 
(iv) perhaps not surprisingly, I find the section on the fiscal arrangements in the euro area as 
the less satisfying. My dissatisfaction concerns not so much the employment of usual and 
dubious shortcuts ("The European Commission can be seen as the equivalent of a central 
government"), which do not do justice to the admittedly complex and unique nature of the 
European Union. Nor would I contest that the Stability and Growth Pact has been less 
effective than its early proponents perhaps naively believed (Stark 2001). Rather, I would 
have liked to see a better recognition of the evolving nature of fiscal governance in the euro 
area and the EU and the acceleration imparted by the to this evolution financial crisis. While 
this is not the place for even summarily charting the course of the reform of fiscal governance 
(see European Commission, 2011, 2012), I would simply like to stress that one criticism that 
the paper, not without some reason, levels at the European fiscal surveillance arrangements, 
namely, that they are "neither supported by hard legislation nor endorsed by the political 
system" arguably no longer holds true. Acknowledging the complementarity between supra-
national and domestic arrangements, and the necessity of political ownership of the former 
through some form of incorporation in the latter, the reform of economic governance that has 
entered into force at the end of 2012 (so-called 'Six-Pack ') includes for the first time a 
European directive setting out standards for domestic budgetary frameworks in a number of 
key areas, to ensure minimum quality as well as consistency with the European framework. 
This trend has received a further decisive impulsion with the signing early in 2012 of the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, which obliges its parties to incorporate in 
their constitution or in other legislation binding the budgetary process the medium-term 
objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact including provision for corrective mechanism in 
case of deviations and for independent fiscal institutions for monitoring observance of the 
rules. While it is clearly too early to pass judgement on the effect of these far-reaching 
reforms, they attest to the euro area ability to learn from its experience with fiscal rules. References 
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